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THE MORNING AFTER:
TRIPS-PLUS, FTAS AND WIKILEAKS
FRESH INSIGHTS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION
AND ENFORCEMENT OF IP PROTECTION IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Mohammed El Said1
ABSTRACT
Leaked diplomatic cables related to the United States‘ foreign policy
implementing and enforcing intellectual property in developing countries
draw a bleak picture. U.S. interest groups and local agents collaborate to
achieve higher levels of intellectual property protection without taking into
consideration the public interest and consumer rights of local communities.
This "act of state-sponsored violence," as some have proclaimed it,
jeopardizes the lives of millions of citizens across the globe. It also
undermines the foundations of the global multilateral trading regime and its
institutions, particularly the World Trade Organization (WTO), which was
created by the global community in 1995 in order to put an end to
multilateralism and multilaterally regulate global trade in goods and
services.
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INTRODUCTION

On August 30, 2011, Wikileaks released the latest batch of classified
U.S. Department of State cables, revealing significant insights related to
various aspects of the United States‘ foreign and trade policy. In
highlighting the severity of the leaks, the Economist remarked that ―if
Cyberspace had air, it would be thick with recrimination.‖2 Of particular
interest to this paper are those cables related to the United States‘ foreign
policy implementing and enforcing intellectual property in developing
countries. The leaks draw a bleak picture, in which U.S. interest groups and
local agents collaborate to achieve higher levels of intellectual property
protection in developing countries, without taking into consideration the
public interest and consumer rights of local communities. This ―act of statesponsored violence,‖ as some have proclaimed it,3 jeopardizes the lives of
millions of citizens across the globe. It also undermines the foundations of
the global multilateral trading regime and its institutions, particularly the
World Trade Organization (WTO), which was created by the global
community in 1995 in order to put an end to multilateralism and
multilaterally regulate global trade in goods and services.
Although the leaks contain references to many other U.S. initiatives and

2

Swept Up and Away, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 10, 2011, at 62.
James Love, In Defense Of WikiLeaks: Looking At Cables On Pharmaceutical Drugs
And Trade Pressures, HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 4, 2011,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-love/wikileaks-cables-pharmaceuticaldrugs_b_947806.html?view=print&comm_ref=false.
3
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efforts aimed towards strengthening and enforcing intellectual property
protection in many developing countries,4 this study will focus on those
related to the implementation of the U.S.-Jordan bilateral Free Trade
Agreement5 (FTA), signed in 2001 in the area of intellectual property
protection. Bilateral FTAs between powerful, industrialized countries,
particularly the United States and European Union, and poorer developing
countries proliferated over the past decade. As now acknowledged by many,
the signing of an FTA represents the beginning of a long and winding road,
but there is little analysis of what actually happens following the conclusion
of a bilateral free trade agreement. This is particularly true in the area of
intellectual property protection, which affects the lives of millions in
developing countries. One reason for the lack of analysis of the
implantation of FTAs is that, in most cases, these agreements are
negotiated, signed, and implemented secretly, behind closed doors with
little public debate and participation.6 This study analyzes the
implementation of U.S.-Jordan FTA based on a thorough review of recent
releases of the Wikileaks cables, supplemented by the observations and
experience of the author in the region.
This study is a first attempt at analyzing and explaining the process that
ensues during the signing of an FTA between a developed and a developing
country. The case of Jordan is invaluable for many reasons. First, the U.S.Jordan FTA was the first FTA signed by the United States with any Arab or
Muslim country.7 Second, the U.S.-Jordan FTA was the first agreement of
its type that contained several intellectual property obligations of a TRIPSPlus nature.8 Third, the U.S.-Jordan FTA is one of the few agreements
where the impacts of FTAs on developing country have been studied.
Research findings have alarmingly affirmed the negative impact arising
from the implementation of comparable FTAs in developing countries,
particularly in the area of public health and access to medicines.9 Within
4

See, e.g., those related to Thailand, Philippines and Guatemala.
Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, Oct. 24, 2000, 41
I.L.M. 63 [hereinafter U.S.-Jordan FTA]
6
For more, see Brian J. Schoenborn, Public participation in trade negotiations: open
agreements, openly arrived at?, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 103 (1995).
7
For more on US-Jordan FTA see Mohammed El-Said, The Evolution of the
Jordanian TRIPS-Plus Model: Multilateralism Vs Bilateralism and the Implications for the
Jordanian IPRs Regime, 37 INT‘L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 501
(2006).
8
On TRIPS-Plus, see Peter Drahos, BITS and BIPS: Bilateralism in Intellectual
Property, 4 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP.791 (2001); Mohammed El-Said, The Road from
TRIPS-Minus to TRIPS to TRIPS-Plus: Implications of IPRs for the Arab World, 8 J.
WORLD INTELL. PROP. 53 (2005).
9
See OXFAM INT‘L, ALL COSTS, NO BENEFITS: HOW TRIPS-PLUS INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RULES IN THE US–JORDAN FTA AFFECT ACCESS TO MEDICINES (2007). See also
5
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this context, this paper will use information obtained through the Wikileaks
to make a more detailed assessment of the process of surveillance and
implementation undertaken by the U.S. authorities following the signing of
a bilateral free trade agreement.
Although the main concern of this study is the domestic process
associated with setting and creating intellectual property protection norms
and regulations in developing countries (particularly Jordan), the study also
highlights how this process relates to the global debate over intellectual
property norms. It reveals the rivalry between the main players—the U.S.
and the E.U.—in this area and their efforts to push the boundaries of
intellectual property protection further in developing countries. Based on
this finding, the study explains the complexities associated with national
norm setting initiatives and concludes that the process of setting and
implementing intellectual property norms at the national level should not be
viewed in isolation from other major global developments. What this study
won‘t do is to delve into the substantive details of the intellectual property
TRIPS-Plus provisions included under the U.S.-Jordan FTA, as this has
been dealt with extensively elsewhere.10
II.

THE BEGINNINGS

Jordan has maintained strong relations with the United States since its
creation as an Emirate in early 1920s.11 The country‘s geography,
demography, pragmatic leadership, and, more recently, its involvement in
the U.S.‘s ―War on Terror,‖ ensured continuous special relationships with
various U.S. administrations, with few exceptions.12
The close relationship between Jordan and the U.S. is evidenced by the
exceptional military and financial support Jordan has received from the U.S.
over the years.13 Jordan is one of the largest recipients of U.S. aid in the
world. Since 1951, the country received approximately $11.38 billion in

Hamed El-Said & Mohammed El-Said, TRIPS-Plus Implications for Access to Medicines
in Developing Countries: Lessons from Jordan-US FTA, 10 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 438
(2007).
10
See El-Said, supra note 7.
11
The U.S. State Department website explains, ‖Relations between the United States
and Jordan have been close for 6 decades, with 2009 marking the 60th anniversary of U.S.Jordanian ties.‖ Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Background Note: Jordan, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE (Dec. 30, 2011), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3464.htm.
12
One exception refers to disagreements over the country‘s support for Iraq during the
first Gulf War (1990-91).
13
See generally on relations AVI SHLAIM, LION OF JORDAN: THE LIFE OF KING
HUSSEIN IN WAR AND PEACE (2007).
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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U.S. aid, third only to Israel and Egypt in the region.14 On September 22,
2008, the U.S. and Jordanian governments reached an agreement, whereby
the United States would provide a total of $660 million in annual foreign
assistance to Jordan over a five year period.15
Jordan has signed a number of bilateral agreements with the U.S. during
the past two decades. For instance, a bilateral ―open skies‖ Aviation
Agreement and a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) were signed between
the two countries in 1996 and 2003, respectively. Additionally, in 1996, the
U.S. Congress created Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ) to support the
peace process signed between Jordan and Israel in 1994. Under the
agreement, QIZ goods that contain at least 12 per cent of their value added
from Israel enter the United States economy tariff and quota-free. This has
had important economic growth implications for the Jordanian economy
and turned the U.S. into Jordan‘s main trading partner (replacing Iraq), by
encouraging and increasing Jordan‘s exportation of light manufactured
products such as garments.
The two countries signed a Science and Technology Cooperation
Agreement in 2007 to facilitate and strengthen mutual scientific
cooperation, as well as a memorandum of understanding on nuclear energy
cooperation. U.S. backing ensured Jordan‘s speedy accession to the WTO in
2000 and subsequently paved the way for the signing of the first bilateral
free trade agreement (FTA) between the U.S. and an Arab country in 2001
(the U.S.-Jordan FTA).16
High levels of collaboration between the two countries in the area of
intellectual property have existed for some time. However, it was often U.S.
pressure, triggered by industry groups, that dictated the terms of the
relationship between the two countries. For instance, until 1998 Jordan was
still placed on the United States‘s ―Section 301 Watch List‖. In the same
year, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA)
went even further, by formally asking the USTR to name Jordan in the next
year as a ―Priority Watch‖ country, for ―failing to provide adequate
intellectual property protection.‖17 The relationship became less turbulent
following the country‘s accession to the WTO and its signing of an FTA
with the U.S. in 2000 and 2001, respectively.

14

JEREMY M. SHARP, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. FOREIGN
ASSISTANCE TO THE MIDDLE EAST: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, RECENT TRENDS, AND THE
FY2011 REQUEST (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL32260.pdf.
15
Id. at 7
16
, supra note 11.
17
See Ghalia Alul, PhRMA Requests Jordan be Placed on “Priority Watch” List,
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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III.

DOMESTIC PROCESS, GLOBAL AGENDA

The information revealed in the Wikileaks reinforces the widely
acknowledged view that the regulation of intellectual property was
deliberately designed with loopholes that could be exploited by its drafters.
As Sell explains:18
Since TRIPs, the institutional environment around
intellectual property has gotten much denser, much thicker,
and much more heavily populated with new forums and
new actors. The result is an increasingly incoherent and
internally inconsistent intellectual property regime. Much
of this incoherence is a product of strategic forum shifting,
in which actors take their intellectual property concerns to
the forums in which they expect to better achieve their
goals. Various interest groups and government agencies
have become heavily invested in increasingly ineffective
approaches to property protection and enforcement.
The case of Jordan not only conforms to these observations, but also
sheds new light on the inconsistencies and loopholes present in intellectual
property regulation, given the explicit influence of the U.S. Government
and its lobbyists over the entire process of negotiations. Persuasion,
motivation, and threats are some of the tools used to influence negotiations.
These mechanisms are often used interchangeably to implement and enforce
high-level intellectual property protection (what is often referred to in the
literature as TRIPS-Plus provisions) in many developing countries,
including Jordan.
The United States‘ position is formulated primarily by the collaborative
effort of several official, governmental, and private interest groups and
agencies that share a unified vision for seeking the implementation and
enforcement of higher intellectual property protection levels—often of a
TRIPS-Plus nature—with their FTA partner state. These groups and
agencies rely upon various strategies in achieving their objectives. The
strategies are often complimented by a ―revolving door‖ policy, through
initiating discussions with and passing messages to various local contacts
and other concerned official departments and authorities.
A snapshot of the main players involved in this process shows an
intricate web of exchanges and discussions between Jordanian and

JORDAN TIMES, April 15, 1998.
18
Susan Sell, Everything Old Is New Again: The Development Agenda Then and Now,
3 WIPO J. 17, 21 (2011).
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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American key players. However, it is important to first identify and explain
the role of each of these players and how this process shapes their positions
and objectives.
The key players representing the United States‘ private sector interests
include a number of historically well-established and organized business
groups and associations. For instance, both the Business Software Alliance
(BSA)19 and the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA)20 have
been vocal in their push for strengthened copyright protection in Jordan.
Meanwhile, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
(PhRMA)21 continues their pursuance of higher levels of intellectual
property protection in the area of pharmaceutical patents in the country.
These business groups and associations are also supported by their local
representatives, agents, and networks of contacts.
Unsurprisingly, these business associations were also the most vocal
advocates and enthusiasts for inclusion of strong provisions for intellectual
property protection—through the implementation of the TRIPS
Agreement—during the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations. The
Uruguay Round lasted from 1986-1994 and culminated in the birth of the
WTO. Their efforts were highly influential in lobbying the United States
government to include intellectual property protection in the negotiations
agenda and in pressuring other developing countries to implement higher
levels of intellectual property protection. Commenting on the role of such
groups, Sell explains:

19

On its website, the BSA presents itself as the ―voice of the world‘s commercial
software industry and its hardware partners before governments and in the international
marketplace. BSA programs foster technology innovation through education and policy
initiatives that promote copyright protection, cyber security, trade, and e-commerce.‖ See
BUSINESS SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, http://www.bsa.org/GlobalHome.aspx (last visited Feb. 9,
2012).
20
―The International Intellectual Property Alliance is a private sector coalition, formed in
1984, consisting of trade associations representing U.S. copyright-based industries in
bilateral and multilateral efforts working to improve international protection and
enforcement of copyrighted materials and open up foreign markets closed by piracy and
other market access barriers.‖ For more see About IIPA, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ALLIANCE, (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.iipa.com/aboutiipa.html.
21
―The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) represents
the US‘s leading pharmaceutical research and biotechnology companies, which are devoted
to inventing medicines that allow patients to live longer, healthier, and more productive
lives. PhRMA companies are leading the way in the search for new cures. PhRMA
members alone invested an estimated $49.4 billion in 2010 in discovering and developing
new medicines. Industry-wide research and investment reached an estimated $67.4 billion
in 2010.‖ For more see About PhRMA, PHRMA (Feb. 9, 2012),
http://www.phrma.org/about/about-phrma.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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These private actors were in a good position in so far as
they represented vigorous export industries that enjoyed
positive balances... They were able to present their
industries as part of the solution to America's trade woes, as
opposed to being part of the problem. They successfully
argued that foreign pirates, particularly in East Asia and
Latin America, were robbing them of hard-earned royalties.
They pushed hard for a trade-based approach to IP
protection.22

Today, these same players continue to pursue a ―maximalist‖ approach
to intellectual property and pressure the U.S. government to pursue higher
levels of intellectual property protection and enforcement in developing
countries. Just as in the economic crises of the 1970s, U.S. industry
representatives today present intellectual property a cure for present day
economic woes and financial crises.23
Several American governmental agencies and bodies also constitute key
players, given their ability to provide official coverage and exercise political
clout and economic leverage. The U.S. Embassy in Amman, which often
acts as a medium in interactions involving U.S. players and stakeholders;
the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR); the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) and its AMIR
Program in Jordan; and the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) appear to be the most active and persevering agencies in the push
for higher intellectual property protection and enforcement.24 Other
agencies and private bodies are periodically called upon to step in and
provide legal review or technical training and advice. These include the
United States Food and Drug Authority (USFDA), the Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and
the Library of the United States Congress (LOC). In addition, a number of
local representatives of large U.S. Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) such
as Microsoft, Caterpillar, and Chrysler, and other industry representatives
also attended and actively participated in a number of workshops and

22

SUSAN SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 86 (2003). For more, see JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS,
GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (2000).
23
Debora Halbert, The Politics of IP Maximalisim, 3 WIPO JOURNAL 81 (2011).
24
For examples, see GIPA - Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Law and Policy
Program - November 5-8, 2007, Amman, Jordan, UNITED STATES PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE, (Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.uspto.gov/ip/events/agenda_jordan.jsp
(describes for one of the USPTO‘s training programs run by its Global Intellectual Property
Academy (GIPA) in Jordan back in 2007.)
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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seminars focusing on intellectual property protection and enforcement in
Jordan.
On the other hand, the cables clearly reveal inadequate levels of
representation from Jordanian enterprises, agencies, and corporations in
developing intellectual property provisions. In a situation often prevalent in
developing and Arab countries, the Jordanian position is generally
―responsive‖ with regard to intellectual property protection.25 Consequently,
the limited and sometimes targeted participation may be confined to a small
number of agencies and/or ministries when discussions on intellectual
property ensue. The main players from the Jordanian side feature the
Ministry of Industry and Trade, the official authority entrusted with
managing industrial property protection in the country; the National
Library, the authority concerned with copyright and neighboring rights
protection, which is part of the Ministry of Culture; and the Jordan Food
and Drug Administration (JFDA), an agency mainly concerned with
granting marketing authorizations for drugs and pharmaceutical products in
the country that is affiliated with the Jordanian Ministry of Health.
In addition, other agencies, officials, and individuals are called upon in
cases where procedural or administrative issues persist, where additional
enforcement levels are sought, or where technical and legal training and
advice are offered.26 Of these, one can identify the Jordan Institute for
Standards and Metrology (JISM), the Jordan Customs Department (JCD),
and the judiciary as recurring players. Unlike the United States‘ private
sector business groups, local business groups are fragmented and seem to
have limited presence and influence over the intellectual property policies
of the government in Jordan. On occasion, some local businesses even align
their business interests with those of their American counterparts.27
Overall, the dynamics of the relationship between these stakeholders
and representatives (both from the United States and Jordan) reflect a

25

―These countries often traded away‘ the issue of intellectual property in exchange
for concessions in other areas without carefully assessing the impact of these trade-offs.‖
MOHAMMED EL SAID, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN
THE ARAB WORLD (2008).
26
In some cases, the U.S. went as far as placing permanent advisers in FTA countries.
A 2011 study, published by IIPA and USPTO, stated that ―Reportedly the technical
assistance includes not only seminars and short training courses but also a group on the
ground in Peru to assist with intellectual property efforts.‖ See ALEXANDER W. KOFF,
LAURA M. BAUGHMAN, JOSEPH F. FRANCOIS & CHRISTINE A. MCDANIEL, INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INSTITUTE, STUDY ON THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ―TRIPS-PLUS‖
FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS (2011), available at
http://www.tradepartnership.com/pdf_files/IIPI%20TRIPS-Plus%20Study.pdf.
27
For instance, the Jordan Intellectual Property Association (JIPA) often advocates a
pro-protection intellectual property approach.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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general pattern of encouragement and collaboration where positions are
unified.28 When positions are not, criticism is often associated with
suspension—or threat of suspension—of funds from the U.S. side as a stick
mechanism.
What is of concern here is the evident lack of public input and the
absence of public participation and civil society representation in these
discussions, particularly from the Jordanian side. As will be discussed in
more detail in the ensuing parts of this article, the main theme emerging
from the discussions and negotiations between the United States teams and
their Jordanian counterparts is the drive to raise levels of intellectual
property protection and enforcement in Jordan, without undertaking a
proper impact assessment or inviting national debate about the effects of
these provisions on society and consumers. Instead, ―intellectual property
rhetoric‖ is inserted into discussions and deliberations, which describes
higher levels of protection and enforcement as an anchor for attracting
businesses, high technology and know-how, and foreign direct investment
(FDI), without providing substantial evidence supporting such claims.
The next part of this paper will present specific examples, which
demonstrate the United States‘ tactics in mobilizing its stakeholders and
governmental agencies in pursuance of strengthened TRIPS-Plus
intellectual property protection levels and enforcement procedures in
Jordan.
IV.

LAYING DOWN THE FOUNDATIONS

Since the U.S.-Jordan FTA was the first FTA signed between the United
States and any Arab or Muslim state, the agreement became a template for
other subsequent FTAs signed in the Middle East. Moreover, the U.S.Jordan FTA was one of the first bilateral agreements to include extensive
TRIPS-Plus provisions. These provisions had noticeable impacts on many
development-related areas.29 In particular, the agreement contains several
TRIPS-Plus provisions, which directly impact public health and access to
28

For instance, in order to intensify the raids against copyright infringers, an
agreement between the National Library and the Business Software Alliance (BSA) was
signed with the aim of identifying those involved in illegal activities. For more, see U.S.
Embassy, Cable 05AMMAN8330, Jordan IPR Problems and Solutions: Part I - Awareness
Campaign Tackles Street-Smart Pirates (Oct. 23, 2005).
29
For more on FTAs‘ impact on the Arab World, see MOHAMMED EL SAID, WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION & INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC HEALTH RELATED TRIPS-PLUS PROVISIONS IN BILATERAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS: A POLICY GUIDE FOR NEGOTIATORS AND IMPLEMENTERS IN THE WHO
EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN REGION (2010), available at
http://www.emro.who.int/publications/Book_Details.asp?ID=1081.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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medicines in the country. These may be summarized as follows:
1. Data exclusivity protection. The U.S.-Jordan FTA obliges Jordan to
provide legal protection for data exclusivity for a period which may
be extended up to eight years. Accordingly, Article 4.22 of the FTA
states that:30
Pursuant to Article 39.3 of TRIPS, each Party, when
requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing
of pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical
products that utilize new chemical entities, the
submission of undisclosed test or other data, or
evidence of approval in another country, the
origination of which involves a considerable effort,
shall protect such information against unfair
commercial use. In addition, each Party shall
protect such information against disclosure, except
where necessary to protect the public or unless steps
are taken to ensure that the information is protected
against unfair commercial use.
2. “New use” legal protection for chemical entities. Although the
TRIPS Agreement does not oblige member states to provide legal
protection for ―new use,‖ the U.S.-Jordan FTA includes reference to
this type of protection. In this regard, Footnote 10 of Article 4.22 the
U.S.-Jordan FTA states that:
It is understood that protection for ―new chemical
entities‖ shall also include protection for new uses
for old chemical entities for a period of three years.
3. Patent term extension: Article 33 of the TRIPS Agreement provides
that legal protection shall be granted to patents for a period of
twenty years from the date of filing. The U.S.-Jordan FTA further
extends this period in order to compensate the applicant for the time

30

Footnotes 10 and 11 of the U.S.-Jordan FTA, which are related to Article 4.22,
subsequently state:
It is understood that protection for ―new chemical entities‖ shall also include
protection for new uses for old chemical entities for a period of three years.
It is understood that, in situations where there is reliance on evidence of
approval in another country, Jordan shall at a minimum protect such information
against unfair commercial use for the same period of time the other country is
protecting such information against unfair commercial use.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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spent during the examination of the application and/or marketing
authorization. Article 4.23 of the U.S.-Jordan FTA states that:
With respect to pharmaceutical products that are subject
to a patent:
a. Each Party shall make available an extension of the
patent term to compensate the patent owner for
unreasonable curtailment of the patent term as a
result of the marketing approval process.
4. Restrictions on compulsory licensing. The TRIPS Agreement grants
member states the right to grant compulsory licenses. However, the
agreement does not list nor specify the grounds whereby such
licenses may be granted, but instead awards member states the
discretion to define such grounds.31 On the other hand, the U.S.Jordan FTA lists the grounds where such licenses may be granted,
hence eroding the policy space available to Jordan, by broadly
defining these grounds. Accordingly, Article 4.20 of the FTA states:
Neither Party shall permit the use of the subject matter
of a patent without the authorization of the right holder
except in the following circumstances
a. to remedy a practice determined after judicial or
administrative process to be anti-competitive;
b. in cases of public non-commercial use or in the case
of a national emergency or other circumstances of
extreme urgency, provided that such use is limited
to use by government entities or legal entities acting
under the authority of a government; or
c. on the ground of failure to meet working
requirements, provided that importation shall
constitute working

The impact of these TRIPS-Plus conditions in the area of public health
and access to medicines is grave. In brief, such measures would result in
prolonging the monopoly terms granted to pharmaceutical patents and
would delay the entrance of generics into the market at an earlier stage.32
31

See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, Art. 30, available online at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm (the TRIPS Agreement).
32
To this effect, a recent study stated that ―Reportedly overlaying U.S.-style rules over
Jordan‘s pharmaceutical sector negatively affects the ability of generic industries to
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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Such delays would result in a substantial increase in the price of medicines
and drugs, due to royalty payments, and would increase governmental
expenditure on public health and medicines as a result.33 Some of these
effects, as will be explained in more detail, have already taken place in the
country.
V.

COSTS WITHOUT BENEFITS: THE MYTHS

After laying the foundations for TRIPS-Plus obligations, under the
national legal framework through the FTA, the United States moved next to
interpreting the obligations during their implementation. The leaked cables
provide some interesting illustrations about how the United States monitors
the implementation of intellectual property obligations of its FTA partner
states, particularly with regard to those commitments related to
pharmaceutical patents. More specifically, the cables explain the interplay
between concerned authorities and groups in both the U.S. and Jordan and
the approach adopted by each in dealing with intellectual property issues
impacting public health and access to medicines. In general, the U.S.
position, backed by its powerful industry interest groups, is centered on
interpreting intellectual property commitments widely, with a TRIPS-Plus
approach, and conflating public health issues with these related to
intellectual property protection. The Jordanian position, on the other hand,
could be best described as ―reactive‖ in most cases, and ―reluctant‖ in some
cases, to heed to the United States‘ demands.
The following examples illustrate in greater detail the interplay between
these various players in relation to a number of issues impacting public
health and access to medicines, as revealed by the leaks.
Data exclusivity appears to be one of the major issues of concern to the
United States included under the U.S.-Jordan FTA.34 Data exclusivity refers
to the procedure wherein originative pharmaceutical companies are granted
a period of time during which would-be generic producers of existing drugs
are prohibited from obtaining regulatory approval for a competing drug if
they rely on the results of the originator‘s clinical trials. Although legal

operate, which is why many from Jordan‘s generic pharmaceutical industry view the FTA
as TRIPS-―Minus‖.‖ See Koff, supra note 27, at 49.
33
For more, see El Said, supra note 30.
34
Pressure was not confined to Jordan in this area; for another example, see
GUATEMALA‘S CONGRESS REINSTATES DATA PROTECTION: THE END OF
THE PROBLEM THAT REFUSED TO GO AWAY (Mar. 11, 201) available at
http://www.keionline.org/node/1206 (the detailed account of U.S. government pressure on
the Guatemalan legislature to shape legislation on pharmaceutical test data protection in the
country).
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protection regimes granting data exclusivity predate the signing of the
TRIPS Agreement,35 the U.S. and EU‘s attempts to include data protection
under the auspices of the TRIPS Agreement were met by fierce resistance.
Due to objections from developing countries, data exclusivity provisions
were ultimately excluded from the TRIPS Agreement.36 However, data
exclusivity was reintroduced by the U.S.—and more recently the E.U.—
through their bilateral FTAs with a number of countries. These agreements
created a de facto legal international protection regime for data exclusivity,
by virtue of Article 4 of the TRIPS Agreement, relating to the Most Favored
Nation ―MFN‖ principle.37
In the case of Jordan, one observes that the issue of data exclusivity
protection features extensively in the U.S. cables, despite the global
criticism that data exclusivity has attracted in recent years.38 Fears of the
monopolistic impact of patent-term extension on prices of medicines and
the curtailment of compulsory licensing appear to have been realized in
Jordan. Nonetheless, Jordan became one of the first Arab countries where
the issue of data exclusivity surfaced during discussions with U.S. officials
following the signing of the Jordan-U.S. FTA, as revealed by the cables.
As stated above, the U.S.-Jordan FTA introduces five years of data
exclusivity that commence on the date of registration of a medicine in the
country.39 An additional three years of data exclusivity (beyond the initial
five years period) are also granted for new uses of known chemical
entities.40 The U.S. cables show how the U.S. attempted to interpret these
provisions in ways that favor its industry's interests and views.
One cable dating back to 2005 stated that international pharmaceutical
companies seem to be generally satisfied with the drug registration system

35

For instance, the North American Free Trade Agreement [hereinafter NAFTA]
included some reference to data exclusivity protection, while the European Community
member states have provided protection for data filed in support of marketing
authorizations for pharmaceuticals since 1987. See Jerome H. Reichman, Rethinking the
Role of Clinical Trial Data in International Intellectual Property Law: The Case for a
Public Goods Approach, 31 MARQUETTE INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1 (2009).
36
For more on history of negotiations, see id.
37
The TRIPS Agreement, Article 4 states:
With regard to the protection of intellectual property, any advantage, favour,
privilege or immunity granted by a Member to the nationals of any other country
shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all other
Members.
38
For more on this debate, see UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, GOOD
PRACTICE GUIDE: IMPROVING ACCESS TO TREATMENT BY UTILIZING PUBLIC HEALTH
FLEXIBILITIES IN THE WTO TRIPS AGREEMENT(2010), available at
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s17762en/s17762en.pdf [hereinafter UNDP].
39
See US-Jordan FTA Article 4.22.
40
See id.
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in Jordan, which is managed mainly by the JFDA.41 Despite this, it was
evident that the U.S. was not satisfied with the pro-public health approach
often adopted by JFDA's committees. The 2005 cable further describes the
committees operating under the JFDA as ―multi-agency committees [that]
do not have the same reputation [as the JFDA], being holdovers from a
former paternalistic era of healthcare.‖42 As demonstrated by the same
cable, the U.S. attempted, on several occasions, to influence the decisions of
the JDFA and its committees. In one data exclusivity dispute, the 2005
cable reports that ―a company filed for protection for a once-a-week-dose
drug in 2004 less than a year before the daily dosing would lose its data
exclusivity protection (for the clinical data that, once in the public domain,
would allow a generic firm to make the same drug and market it at reduced
costs).‖43 After reaching the court, the case was ―dismissed on a technicality
unrelated to the substantive dispute.‖
Unsatisfied with this result, which, in the eyes of the U.S. embassy,
meant that the generic company had ―won‖ the dispute, the cable explains
that ―'[s]ome in the PhRMA community believe it was a breach of the law
for the [government of Jordan] to fail to uphold the FTA obligation to
protect data submitted for the once-weekly dose, regardless of any lawyer
court decision. However, to maintain harmonious relations with its
regulator, the aggrieved company—which continues to believe itself to have
been wronged—decided not to pursue the case.‖44 Disregarding the
independence of the Jordanian judiciary and the fact that the FTA itself did
not include such an obligation, the cable boldly states:
The weekly-dose case raises the general problem with data
exclusivity and NCE's [new chemical entities] in Jordan.
For example, an adult dosage, a children's dose, and a preschool or infant dose – each with its own set of data in
support of JFDA approval – should receive, each in its own
turn, five years of protection, according to the
manufacturer. But the JFDA can't square that proposition
with its view of a single NCE deserving only one period of
five-year protection. As PhRMA and individual companies
read it, the FTA appears to come down more strongly in
favor of protections from "unfair competition" and to be
more favorable toward data exclusivity in the narrowest
sense, for each dose. The main FTA provisions on drugs –
41

U.S. Embassy, Cable 05AMMAN9748, Jordan‘s IPRS Challenges and Solutions:
Part III - Pharmaceuticals Pose Frontier IPR Issues (December 19, 2005).
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FTA Article 4, paragraph 22 and its related footnotes –
have yet to be interpreted in a manner acceptable to all,
however.45

If the U.S. had gotten its way, an additional protection period would
have prevented the generic medicine from entering the market, a provision
which would have hurt domestic consumers. The U.S. interpretation takes a
clear pro-protection approach that favors U.S. pharmaceutical
manufacturers, but disregards the public interests of developing countries.
In another case, a dispute over a cancer treatment raised the issue of
when the exclusivity period actually begins: when the drug is first used
under a tender or when it is first approved by the regulator. An embassy
cable reports that back in 2001, an originative firm's cancer treatment was
approved for tender in a Jordanian government hospital.46 Afterwards, the
manufacturer filed a formal request for the drug's approval by the national
JFDA. However, in 2005, a generic of the same drug, produced by an
Australian company, appeared on the market, less than five years after the
original drug had received JFDA approval. In responding to the complaint,
the JFDA Director General explained that JFDA officials reasoned that the
drug had enjoyed five years of data exclusivity, dating from the special
tender bid in 2001. On the other hand, the innovator manufacturer
disagreed, arguing that the data exclusivity period began with the more
recent JFDA approval. The JFDA maintained its position that the same rule
applies to all situations: the data exclusivity period begins the moment a
drug gets approval under the tender and not upon subsequent registration.
Unhappy with the JFDA‘s interpretation, the U.S. Embassy called for a
review of the FTA, while USAID‘s AMIR program called upon legal
consultants to conduct a gap analysis to provide legislative
recommendations. The U.S. Embassy even went further, by boldly
demanding that Jordan‘s JFDA should include a PhRMA representative on
the "High Committee for Drugs.‖47 This request clearly reflects a high level
of U.S. interference in the work of the JFDA. Conversely, the U.S. would
likely object if the same request was made by a Jordanian—or even a
European—delegation demanding the inclusion of their representative in
the board of the United States Food and Drug Authority (USFDA).
The two previous examples demonstrate how the United States
45

Id.
Id. (In these special tender cases, a waiver is often obtained through the traditional
JFDA approval process.)
47
The PhRMA would serve as one of three private sector members on the committee,
which is tasked with ruling on directives regarding drug approvals and intellectual property
issues.
46
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attempted to broadly interpret FTA provisions and to influence the
decisions of public health authorities in Jordan, so as to grant longer
protection periods of data exclusivity to pharmaceutical innovators. It also
shows how U.S. authorities tried to influence the process of granting
approvals to generic medicines, in accordance with PhRMA‘s
interpretation. However, the FTA itself does not contain any provisions
which obligate Jordan to interpret the agreement in line with the US‘
position.48
Empirical research also supports the argument that data exclusivity
protection measures had negative effects on public health in Jordan. In
2007, Oxfam International published a study on the U.S.-Jordan FTA. This
study was one of the earliest that analyzed the impact of FTAs upon public
health and access to medicines in developing countries.49 The findings of
the study were alarming; they explicitly stated that the U.S.-Jordan FTA had
a negative impact on access to medicines, finding that:50
TRIPS-plus rules, particularly data exclusivity, independently
prevented generic competition for 79 per cent of medicines launched
by 21 multinational pharmaceutical companies since 2001.
Additional expenditures for medicines with no generic competitor,
as a result of enforcement of data exclusivity, were between $6.3m
and $22.04m.
In addition to the issue of data exclusivity, the U.S.-Jordan FTA also
included references to the protection of ―new use.‖51 New use protection
aims at enabling new uses of known substances, by issuing a patent on the
new use(s). Therefore, if a certain drug was found to work in another field,
in which it was not protected, an additional period of patent protection
could be awarded for an already known and registered drug, thereby
extending the patent protection term substantially. This process is referred
to as ―evergreening.‖
Once again, the cables evidence how the U.S. attempted to widely
interpret TRIPS-Plus provisions related to ―new use,‖ as stipulated under
the U.S.-Jordan FTA. In one dispute, a drug used as an anti-asthma therapy
came onto the market in 2005, but new chemical data trials showed that the
drug was also effective for those patients exhibiting both asthma and coexisting allergic rhinitis. The JFDA approved the drug for the ―new use,‖
48

For more on impact, see El Said, supra note 30 and UNDP, supra note 39.
All costs, no benefits: how TRIPS-plus intellectual property rules in the US–Jordan
FTA affect access to medicines, OXFAM BRIEFING NOTE (Oxfam Int‘l, Oxford), Mar. 2007.
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but not for a ―new indication,‖ as U.S. representatives called for. The JFDA
justified its position by claiming that the ―gray area of overlapping uses
does not permit a distinction,‖ and argued that it was therefore unwilling to
grant an additional three years of exclusivity protection.52 The JFDA‘s
reasoning supported domestic public interest considerations.
The cables revealed PhRMA's outrage on this issue; in PhRMA's view,
when a product was approved for a "new use," the period of data exclusivity
should be expanded from five to eight years, at minimum, for that ―new
use.‖53 The cable states that ―after the innovator appealed, and when
[embassy officials] highlighted the appeal for the JFDA [Director General],
it appears the JFDA will be taking a second, harder look at what 'protection'
means.‖54 It was not clear how the JFDA handled the issue of ―new use‖
following the appeal.
Scrutinizing the cables, a sense of frustration on the part the U.S.
officials is evident, as a result of JFDA's reluctant approach to award
additional TRIPS-Plus protection to drug manufacturers. This frustration is
apparent despite the fact that the JFDA's position was influenced by
domestic public health considerations. The cables further demonstrate U.S.
dissatisfaction with the JFDA's drug approval process. One cable states that
―[a]dding to manufacturer's concerns, the JFDA includes an extra layer of
safety to its drug approval process by requiring that a drug be on the open
market in one of seven countries with high safety standards for a full year
before it can receive a formal approval in Jordan.‖55 The cable unearths
complaints about this strict requirement and the fact that the JFDA‘s drug
approval process may last up for a period of six months, stating that
―PhRMA companies deem this a technical barrier to market access.‖56 The
U.S. position is tenuous, as the TRIPS Agreement and the U.S.-Jordan FTA
do not contain any obligations for Jordan in this area, but rather leave space
for Jordan to set policy in line with its national legal framework and
administrative procedures.
Dissatisfied that its discussions with the JFDA were largely fruitless, it
was time for the U.S. to widen the scope of the debate and engage other
national players in the discussion. The U.S. decided that the next step would
be to engage the Ministry of Industry and Trade in these discussions,
bypassing the Ministry of Health altogether. It was time to bring the FTA‘s
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U.S. Embassy, Cable 05AMMAN9748, Jordan‘s IPS Challenges and Solutions: Part
III- Pharmaceuticals Pose Frontier IPR Issues (Dec. 19, 2005).
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP

19

PIJIP Research Paper No. 2012-03

most powerful card to the table.
Through several exchanges between the U.S. embassy, the JFDA, and
the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the U.S. demanded that the government
of Jordan abide ―scrupulously‖ by its FTA commitments regarding
pharmaceuticals protection.57 Accordingly, it would be imperative that more
bilateral consultation be established, in order to implement the obligations
of the FTA. The cable further explains that the USAID‘s AMIR program
had already called upon legal consultants to conduct a gap analysis, to study
whether relevant legislation might be lacking in the country. As mentioned,
the Embassy went even further, by boldly asking the JFDA to include a
PhRMA representative on the High Committee for Drugs. Additionally, the
cable reports that the U.S. requested that the Ministry of Industry and
Trade—which seems to have been more receptive to U.S. demands—should
also have a member on the High Committee of Drugs.58 Moreover,
following one of the joint meetings attended by the Minister of Industry and
Trade, the JFDA Director General, and U.S. embassy representatives, the
Minister of Industry and Trade told U.S. representatives that Jordan wished
to be consistent with ―international best practices and adhere to the FTA.‖59
The cable further reports that the Minister assured the representatives
Jordan would rectify the situation if such was not in line with its FTA
obligations.60 This reference reflects a questionable position, taking into
consideration that the notion of a uniform ―international best practices‖
does not exist in this particular area, where countries typically exercise
considerable discretion. In any case, the cable went further, reporting that
the government of Jordan had invited the U.S. government to provide its
own "position papers outlining any concerns" about the "international best
practices."61 The cables did not reveal what the U.S. advice in relation to
this request was.
The U.S. has often proclaimed that these FTAs (containing strengthened
intellectual property rules of a TRIPS-Plus nature) would facilitate and
encourage technology transfer and increase foreign direct investment (FDI)
flows to its partner FTA states,62 a claim which is, unfortunately, echoed by
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many uninformed national politicians.63 For instance, a report published in
2004 by the International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI) in partnership
with the AMIR program claimed that stronger intellectual property
protections area is helping to transform Jordan into the leading knowledge
economy in the region and that Jordan‘s pharmaceutical sector has actually
benefited from the strengthening of its intellectual property regime. The
report also claims that there is a growing multinational presence, medical
tourism has taken on new importance, and the number of clinical trials in
the country has multiplied. The study continues by stating that intellectual
property reforms in Jordan have motivated local industry to cultivate a great
deal of ―business activity that is intellectual property-intensive and high
value-added.‖64
Once again, emerging evidence contradicts these claims. In its 2007
Study on the U.S.-Jordan FTA, Oxfam International published the
following findings:65
There has been nearly no FDI by foreign drug companies in Jordan
since 2001 to synthesize or manufacture medicines in partnership
with local generics companies, and this has harmed public health.
The only FDI into Jordan by foreign drug companies has been to
expand scientific offices, which use aggressive sales tactics to
ensure that expensive patented medicines are used in lieu of
inexpensive generics.
Stricter intellectual property rules have not encouraged companies in
Jordan to engage in R&D for medicines since the passage of the
FTA, thus these companies have not developed any new medicines.
63

Nesheiwat states that ‗Jordanian officials, most notably the under-secretary for
Industry and Trade, consistently cite the adoption of modern intellectual property laws in
Jordan as a prerequisite for foreign direct investment inflows into the Jordanian economy‘.
Ferris K. Nesheiwat, The Adoption of Intellectual Property Standards beyond TRIPS - Is It
a Misguided Legal and Economic Obsession by Developing Countries, 32 Loy. L.A. Int'l &
Comp. L. Rev. 361 (2010), (316-391), at 366. Furthermore, a recent Study found that in
relation to trademark protection, ‗Judges in Jordan explained that TRIPS-Plus is helpful
because it raises awareness of and respect for IPR among the domestic population and
provides foreign investors with greater comfort in doing business in the country. The
enforcement provisions of the FTA also provided additional flexibility that judges could
use when meting out penalties and sentences, and there were many technical assistance
training sessions and workshops that reportedly would not have happened without the
FTA‘. See Alexander W. Koff, Laura M. Baughman, Joseph F. Francois, Christine A.
McDaniel, Study on the Economic Impact of ―TRIPS-Plus‖ Free Trade Agreements, study
by International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI) and the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO). 2011, available at
http://www.tradepartnership.com/pdf_files/IIPI%20TRIPS-Plus%20Study.pdf, at p 29.
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The number of new products launched in Jordan is only a fraction of
the new products launched in the U.S. and the E.U. Many new
medicines launched in Jordan are exorbitantly priced and
unaffordable for ordinary people. Few or no units of these recently
launched medicines have actually been purchased on the local
market.

Others have reached similar conclusions in studying the impact of
expanding intellectual property protection in Jordan. Nesheiwat, for
instance, states that ―there is little, if any, relationship between FDI and
intellectual property standards, and ... numbers constantly used to prop up
such a connection for Jordan are misused and cartoon-like in their
simplicity.‖66
Similar findings were reiterated by U.S. Embassy cables themselves. A
2008 cable explains that the withdrawal of the multinational pharmaceutical
giant Bristol Mayers Squibb (BMS) from the Jordanian market had, in fact,
caused anxiety in the country.67 This came following a statement made by
BMS Vice President that the company was about to close down its
Jordanian sales operations, and that its products would no longer be
available for sale in the country. This step was ―part of a larger corporate
strategy;‖ it was reported by the BMS Vice President that this had nothing
to do with the ―local political situation, the security situation, the
ease/difficulty of doing business, nor Jordan's intellectual property rights
(IPR) record.‖68 The cable added that the decision was met with ―serious
concerns and confusion‖ by Jordanian businessmen, doctors, and
government officials.69 Furthermore, officials were concerned that this
move, which placed Jordan alongside countries such as Syria, Sudan and
Yemen (the other countries included in BMS‘s withdrawal decision), would
send a negative signal about Jordan‘s business environment and would also
limit the availability of cancer drugs to its nationals. Innumerable calls were
made by Jordanian government officials to the regional representative of
PhRMA, arguing that Jordan's ―efforts to improve IPR and the
attractiveness of the market are wasted if companies pull-out.‖70 Despite
Jordan‘s commitment to provide higher levels of intellectual property
protection, the government was unable to persuade BMS to change its
decision to close down its operations. Evidently, higher intellectual property
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levels had no positive impact on the company‘s decision. PhRMA was in no
mood to ride against the tide of an American firm and defend Jordan‘s
interests.
The example cited above clearly demonstrates that even with an FTA
containing TRIPS-Plus protection regime, there are no guarantees that
powerful countries will seek to encourage their MNEs to invest in
developing-country partners, or even to preserve and sustain the level of
investments that had already been established prior to the signing of the
FTA.
As this section reveals, the U.S. utilized various techniques in pushing
its TRIPS-Plus agenda, engaging a broad range of Jordanian partners in the
process. But an important question arises: what lessons did the U.S. lean
from its FTA experience with Jordan?
In order to avoid any misinterpretation following the implementation of
an FTA, the United States revised its standard intellectual property
provisions for FTAs. Subsequent FTAs included more detailed and
comprehensive chapters dealing with intellectual property protection than
the chapter included under the U.S.-Jordan FTA. For example, while the
U.S.-Jordan FTA included only five pages dedicated to intellectual property
protection, the U.S.-Oman and U.S.-Bahrain FTAs signed subsequently
each included twenty five pages of intellectual property commitments.71
Despite the negative effects stemming from intellectual property measures
within its own FTA, one might argue that Jordan was blessed to be the first
country to sign an FTA with the U.S.
VI.

AN UNFINISHED AGENDA? THE MORE THE MERRIER

The agencies and groups representing U.S. interests operate through an
organized agenda that requires collaboration and coordination of their
efforts. The process often follows a clear and defined pattern, summarized
as follows. First, the U.S. embassy staff, in collaboration with multinational
companies, identifies an issue of interest (either a problem of current
concern to U.S. industry groups or the need for a legislative reform in the
host country). Then discussions are initiated with several local agencies and
authorities. This process often includes engagement through the provision
of advice, propositions for reform, and—depending on the nature of the
issue concerned—the use of stick and carrot techniques if needed.
The following example demonstrates this process, by describing how
71
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U.S. industry groups attempted to achieve their objectives in advocating
TRIPS-Plus standards in the area of copyright protection and enforcement
in Jordan.
In one of the cables dating back to 2003, a U.S. Embassy official
reported that meetings with a number of Jordanian officials took place to
discuss a complaint related to the importation of pirated software from Syria
into the country.72 The complaint was initiated in 2002 by Electronic Arts (a
U.S. entertainment software developer) and was subsequently brought to the
attention of the USPTO and the U.S. Embassy in Jordan by the IIPA. The
main claim, according to the cable, was that Jordanian customs authorities
had been releasing unauthorized copies of Electronic Arts‘ software, which
was imported from Syria, into the local market, without first seeking the
opinion of the National Library (the entity responsible for copyright
enforcement in Jordan). Electronic Arts asserted that Jordanian customs
had instead relied on approvals from the Ministry of Information's
"Censorship Office,‖ which has no copyright enforcement authority, as the
basis for releasing the pirated goods.73
Although the initial assessment put forth in the U.S. Embassy cable
explains that the cause of this infraction was a ―communications breakdown
within Jordan's piracy interdiction system,‖74 the cable reassuringly explains
that such was not ―a willful attempt to circumvent the existing IPR
protection regime‖ in the country.75 The cable further states that
―[n]evertheless, our interviews have highlighted gaps in the current system
that we hope to begin addressing through increased training and retooling of
the procedural and legislative framework for IPR protection in Jordan.‖76
Taking advantage of the presence of a high-level Jordanian delegation in
Washington for a concurrent economic meeting, the USPTO took it upon
itself to raise the complaint to the Jordanian Industry and Trade Minister,
who in turn promised to review the complaint upon his return to the
country. Subsequent meetings took place, which followed up on the
complaint and relayed U.S. concerns about Jordan‘s intellectual property
regime. These meetings included representatives from the Ministry of
Industry and Trade, the Customs Directorate, the Amman Customs House,
the Jaber Border Crossing with Syria, the National Library, and the
72
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Censorship Office. Ultimately, the Amman Customs House admitted that
such activity did take place in the past, due to a lack of coordination
amongst concerned agencies, but assured the U.S. Embassy official that this
would not be a problem in the future.77 Finally, the cable states that the U.S.
Embassy was considering a request for provision of additional training for
line officers at border points on intellectual property issues. The cable
called for a review of current intellectual property legislation and suggested
that new mechanisms were needed to ensure better coordination between
the concerned public authorities to enhance the National Library's ability to
initiate enforcement and confiscation actions. The majority of prescribed
measures are classified as TRIPS-Plus in their nature.
This, however, was not the end of the story. Subsequent cables show a
high level of persistence and determination in U.S. efforts to enforce its
intellectual property related demands. As Jordan was expected to comply
with its TRIPS-Plus FTA obligations, shortly after the signing of the FTA,
an opportunity arose. To ensure full compliance, the United States tied
intellectual property legislative (including copyright) reform to its promise
of
much needed financial and economic assistance. Accordingly,
amendments to the national copyright legislation were reviewed, as part of
the USAID-sponsored ''conditions precedent.' This exercise was tied to aidrelated cash transfers, making it clear that it is only when legislative
changes were undertaken would economic assistance be provided.78 As a
result, on March 31, 2005, a new FTA-compliant copyright law containing
several TRIPS-Plus conditions was published in the official gazette.
One would think that the amendment to the copyright law would
suffice, thereby bringing the issue to an end. Unfortunately, this was not the
case. The cables, once again, reveal ongoing monitoring and surveillance,
aimed towards ensuring a high level of enforcement and compliance with
the new copyright law. In addition, the cables identified other weak
enforcement procedures and measures which, from the U.S. point of view,
required reform. In 2005, the U.S. embassy in Amman reported that
―[w]ithin days of the [copyright] law's publication, the enforcement unit
based in the National Library conducted raids on 40 to 50 shops along
Amman's Garden Street.‖79 The cable also stated that the raids were
directed towards software piracy activities, in which pirated software was
confiscated and infringers were referred for prosecution, in accordance with
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the new copyright law. The cable affirmed a desire to ensure compliance
and expressed fears about the weakness of penalties imposed upon
infringers, stating that the U.S. ―will attempt to follow these cases through
the courts to identify and report strengths or weaknesses of the enforcement
system.‖80 Interestingly, the same cable shows some frustration with the
judiciary's lack of enthusiasm for laying down severe penalties against the
infringers; it argued for the need to send a clearer message that ―crime does
not pay.‖81 As more awareness and training were needed to ensure proper
enforcement, the National Library, with the assistance of USAID, was to
launch a public campaign on intellectual property awareness and
enforcement in the country. A key aim of the campaign would be to
―convince the judiciary to enforce the new penalties available under the
Copyright Law.‖82 The cable clearly identified the judiciary as the next
institution to be targeted in its quest for stricter intellectual property
enforcement.
By observing global developments, it becomes evident that these
national discussions were not isolated from those taking place
internationally. In 2009, the IIPA submitted to the USTR a Special Mention
report on Jordan, highlighting some of the main areas of concern (some of
which were already included under the U.S.-Jordan FTA). These areas
included:83
Anti-Circumvention and Technological Protection Measures
(―TPMs‖),
Appropriately Narrow Exceptions and Limitations.
Compensatory Damages.
Deterrent Statutory Maximum Fines.
Seizure of Documentary Evidence.
Ex Officio Enforcement Authority.
Presumptions of Ownership and Subsistence of Copyright.
Fixing Provision Allowing Alteration of Features in Seized
Materials, Which Impinges on Exclusive Adaptation Right.
Customs/Border Provisions.
Unsurprisingly, most of these issues, which were raised at the domestic
level in Jordan, were discussed and later included in the highly
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controversial Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) in 2011.84
VII.

OURS VS. THEIRS

One of the interesting insights the cables reveal is the relationship
between the major players (mainly the E.U. and U.S.) and the processes by
which each perceives and monitors the other's initiatives in developing
countries. Although competing interests may dictate different strategies and
approaches, both the E.U. and the U.S. are united in their vision for raising
the levels of intellectual property protection globally, through various
means including bilateral free trade and association agreements.85
Although Jordan signed an Association Agreement with the E.U. back
in 1997, before inking an FTA with the U.S. in 2001, it took five years to
get the E.U. agreement ratified. Quipping about such a slow process, a 2002
U.S. Embassy Cable highlights the slowness and weakness of the E.U.
Association Agreement (AA), which contains mild intellectual property
obligations in comparison to those in the U.S. FTAs. In the cable, U.S.
officials brushed away fears about its impact, by stating that the E.U.
Agreement ―does little for Jordan's Economy‖ and that the long ratification
process had, in fact, ―frustrated Jordan and embarrassed the E.U. diplomats
[t]here.‖86
At the same time, the cables highlight the U.S.‘s real concern regarding
the E.U.-Jordan AA: its fear of the E.U.‘s attempt to bring Jordan and other
partner countries in the region in line with the E.U.'s position on a number
of global issues currently subject to international debate. These issues
included labeling, Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO's), Sanitary
Phytosanitary SPS measures, and other similar issues in the WTO. The
cable concludes that the U.S. Embassy in Amman will ―continue to monitor
these efforts, and to work closely with the [Government of Jordan] to ensure
it maintains its close partnership with the U.S. on central WTO issues.‖87
Once again, this example shows the close and detailed monitoring
carried out by the U.S., with respect developing countries' interactions with
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other global players. It uncovers deliberate U.S. aspirations and efforts to
restore the balance in its favor, thus preventing other major players from
molding and influencing developing countries‘ position under the
international framework.
VIII.

THE FTAS CLUB

The cables further uncover a global aspiration that the U.S. aims to
achieve by linking its FTA partnerships. Accordingly, the U.S. is using its
FTAs to form alliances and groups that would support its positions globally.
This vision is not confined to the U.S.; the E.U. attempts to achieve a
similar outcome in the Arab World through its Barcelona Process and the
subsequent association agreements it has signed with a number of Arab
States. However, the U.S. position is unique, as a result of the politics and
techniques it adopts in order to achieve that goal.
Back in 2003, a U.S. Embassy cable reported that Singapore's Trade
Minister had passed a letter to the King of Jordan during the World
Economic Forum, hosted in Jordan, proposing an FTA between Jordan and
Singapore.88 Although an agreement of this nature would seem a natural
progression of the relationship between both countries as a result of
Singapore‘s historical good relations with the region and its Muslim
community, one must take note of the U.S. role in steering the two countries
towards a closer relationship. Notably, both countries had just signed an
FTA with the U.S. Thus, the question arises as to where the idea of the
Singapore-Jordan FTA originated.
The cable states that a senior Singaporean trade official had told
Singapore's acting political and economic counsel that the Middle East is
―an important region, but one where Singapore's economic engagement has
been minimal.‖89 The cable goes further, indicating that the idea of the
Singapore-Jordan FTA had ―initially been raised by then USTR Barshefsky,
when the U.S. and Singapore were planning to use the U.S.-Jordan FTA as
a model for the U.S.-Singapore FTA.‖90 Shortly thereafter, in 2004, the
Jordan-Singapore FTA was signed.
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IX.

CONCLUSION

The recent release of U.S. Department of State Cables provided us with
a rare opportunity to view the back-door initiatives and discussions
involved in shaping and regulating intellectual property between developed
and developing countries through the use of FTAs. From the U.S. position,
this represents a historical continuation of previous initiatives aimed
towards raising the levels of intellectual property rights globally. These
efforts have been carried out with little consideration for other countries‘
interests. Remarks made by President in Obama in 2010 suggest that this
policy will continue with the same vigor in the near future:91
What‘s more, we‘re going to aggressively protect our
intellectual property. Our single greatest asset is the
innovation and the ingenuity and creativity of the American
people. It is essential to our prosperity and it will only
become more so in this century. But it‘s only a competitive
advantage if our companies know that someone else can‘t
just steal that idea and duplicate it with cheaper inputs and
labor. There‘s nothing wrong with other people using our
technologies, we welcome it—we just want to make sure
that it‘s licensed, and that American businesses are getting
paid appropriately. That‘s why USTR [the United States
Trade Representative] is using the full arsenal of tools
available to crack down on practices that blatantly harm our
businesses, and that includes negotiating proper protections
and enforcing our existing agreements, and moving forward
on new agreements, including the proposed AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement.
It is unlikely that this aggressive trend related to intellectual property
enforcement in developing countries will undergo significant change. On
January 24, 2012, in his State of the Union Speech, President Obama
promised additional measures and assured American industries of the U.S.
position in protecting its interest, by stating:92
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It's not right when another country lets our movies, music,
and software be pirated... Tonight, I'm announcing the
creation of a Trade Enforcement Unit that will be charged
with investigating unfair trade practices.... There will be
more inspections to prevent counterfeit or unsafe goods
from crossing our borders.

Indeed, one would question the prudence of this policy in the longrun.93 However, this aggressive posture ignores the historical polices
adopted by the U.S. during its transition to industrialization and innovation,
which were heavily reliant on others‘ innovations. On the other hand, the
U.S. position raises some questions about the prudence of this, for both the
United States and the global community. As Sell explains:94
The United States‘ aggressive decades-long push to ratchet
up intellectual property protections may come back to
haunt it sooner than later. It is easy to imagine that in the
not-too-distant future, US consumers will be paying more
royalties to foreign rights holders. Pharmaceutical
innovation virtually has come to a halt in the US, with
many blockbuster drugs about to come off patent and very
little new drugs in the pipeline. Many critics contend that
the US patent system is choking off innovation with
strategic patenting, patent thickets, and overly broad
claims. Numerous in-depth critiques of the US patent
system have raised profound questions about the wisdom of
exporting our broken and dysfunctional system.
On the other hand, the recent developments—or revolutions—taking
place in the Arab World, witnessed in the emergence of the ―Arab Spring,‖
are changing how governments are responding to their citizens‘ aspirations.
At the heart of these revolutions lies the call for a more balanced,
participatory, and transparent national decision-making process. Careful
consideration of the public interest is fundamental for successful decisionmaking and policy-setting. One is hopeful that the regulation of intellectual
property at the national levels is no exception.
Though often referred to as an ―oasis of calm‖ in a turbulent region,95
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Jordan is not isolated from the recent developments in the Middle East. The
country is experiencing an unprecedented wave of reform championed by
King Abdullah II.96 References to political and economic reform,
transparency, and the fight against corruption are commonplace in presentday headlines in Jordan. One can hope that these developments and calls
will reach those involved in intellectual property policy-making, and
prompt them to adopt a more balanced and participatory approach, by
engaging concerned stakeholders and placing the public interest at the
center of policy-making. For now, however, the morning after the signing
of an FTA remains a stormy one.

June 23, 2010.
96
I.
FOR MORE, SEE MARWAN MUASHER, A DECADE OF STRUGGLING
REFORM EFFORTS IN JORDAN: THE RESILIENCE OF THE RENTIER SYSTEM ,
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT‘L PEACE, THE CARNEGIE PAPERS (MAY
2011) AVAILABLE AT
HTTP://CARNEGIEENDOWMENT.ORG/2011/05/11/DECADE-OFSTRUGGLING-REFORM-EFFORTS-IN-JORDAN-RESILIENCE-OF-RENTIERSYSTEM/P6.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP

